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 Ahmet Tuncay Teksoz and Serdar Sayan
 Simulation of Benefits and Risks
 After the Planned Privatization of the
 Pension System in Turkey
 Is the Expected Boost to Financial
 Markets Feasible?
 Abstract: The recently started process of social security reform in Turkey is widely argued
 to have a significant potential to affect the direction of further development of financial
 markets in the country in the years ahead, particularly through the planned introduction of
 privately managed defined-contribution (or money purchase) retirement plans. This paper
 aims to evaluate the prospects for the emergence and growth of a demand for these plans by
 analyzing investment risks and associated benefits facing employees purchasing them and
 to assess the effectiveness of various risk-reduction strategies that might be pursued by
 individuals as well as the government. Within this framework, a money purchase pension
 plan, supplementary to the basic state scheme, is considered. Possible variations in a
 member's pension income, arising due to stochastic increases in salary earnings and in
 vestment returns under alternative portfolios, are captured using an actuarial simulation
 model designed for this purpose. The cost to the government of providing guarantees on
 minimum pension incomes and the effects of changes in individuals' investment strategies,
 retirement ages, and career patterns on the retirement benefits obtained are investigated,
 and the results are related to various aspects of social security reform-financial market
 interaction in Turkey.
 The authors are, respectively, Head of the Social Security Department at the
 Undersecretariat of Treasury, Ankara, and an Associate Professor of Economics at Bilkent
 University, Ankara. They appreciate comments and questions of the participants at the twenty
 sixth annual meeting of the Middle East Economic Association, held in New Orleans,
 Louisiana (January 5-7, 2001), where an earlier version of this paper was presented.
 They are also grateful to an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions from which
 they benefited a great deal. Any errors or omissions that might remain, however, are solely
 the authors' responsibility.
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 Many observers argue that the direction of further development of Turkish finan
 cial markets in the years ahead depends largely on the outcome of the recently
 started reform process for rehabilitating the financially troubled social security sys
 tem in the country. At the center of attention are two major channels through which
 the reform will affect financial markets. The first is the expected reduction in defi
 cits of social security institutions that, by the end of the last decade, had become
 the major contributor to the borrowing requirements of the government, diverting
 savings away from financial markets. The second channel is the currently planned
 introduction of privately managed defined-contribution (also called "money pur
 chase") retirement plans?which are often argued to have the potential to boost the
 long-term savings and the volume of financial transactions in Turkey. Despite wide
 spread talk about potential contributions of the reform process for the further de
 velopment and deepening of financial markets, and to the liberalization process of
 the Turkish economy in general, a comprehensive and rigorous analysis on the
 feasibility or the likely magnitude of the expected boost is yet to appear in the
 literature.1 This paper aims to contribute to the process of informed discussion on
 various aspects of social security reform-financial market interaction in light of the
 planned introduction of money purchase schemes in Turkey.
 Turkey's publicly managed, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system began to generate
 large deficits after 1990. The rapidly growing contribution of the social security
 system to public sector imbalances made the need for reform increasingly visible,
 eventually proving to be unsustainable by the end of the 1990s (Sayan and Kiraci
 2001a, 2001b; Topal 1999). Since the primary reasons underlying the deficits were
 the generosity of benefits relative to contributions and unreasonably early retire
 ment ages, the government responded by introducing a bill for parametric reform
 involving changes in the values of critical policy parameters such as the statutory
 entitlement (minimum retirement) ages and contribution/replacement rates. Other
 important changes brought about by the bill included a switch from nominal to
 real wages in the calculation of pension benefits, and the introduction of unem
 ployment insurance (Akmaz 2000; Sayan 2001). Although the bill legislated in
 September 1999 could be viewed as an imperative step to curb the growth in social
 security deficits in the short run and is likely to reduce the deficit in the medium
 run, its long-run impact has yet to be seen (IMF 2000).2 Since complete elimina
 tion of social security deficits was expected to require additional measures,3 how
 ever, the legislation of 1999 was intended to be just the first stage of a larger
 reform to overhaul the system. A particularly important step toward the comple
 tion of the reform process is the planned introduction of money purchase pension
 schemes to be managed by the private sector (IMF 2000). The legal and regulatory
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 framework has already been drawn up through a bill currently awaiting ratifica
 tion of the Turkish parliament. As stated in the Letter of Intent of December 1999
 submitted to the IMF by the Turkish government,4 the bill aims to intensify social
 security reform and diversify the sources of long-term savings by creating the
 legal infrastructure for the establishment and development of privately managed
 pension funds.
 Pension companies to be established within this framework will offer pension
 income to active workers who contribute a predetermined portion of their earned
 salaries. Under these plans, the contribution receipts will be accumulated and in
 vested in each member's account and the retirement income will depend on the
 level of contributions and investment returns. Operation of such a defined-contri
 bution-based pension scheme requires involvement of such financial institutions
 as insurance companies, unit trusts, and banks. Since the contributions collected
 need to be invested in various financial assets, the system has the potential to sig
 nificantly boost the volume of financial transactions in Turkey, facilitate deepening
 of financial markets in the country, and contribute to the privatization process.
 As suggested in the social security reform literature, these are in fact the poten
 tial benefits of introducing money purchase pension schemes offered by the pri
 vate sector for liberalization and development of financial markets. Such schemes
 are also likely to have a positive impact on macroeconomic balances since they
 facilitate the management of public deficits by reducing the publicly managed
 social security systems' risks of default and help increase long-term savings?
 making them even more desirable (World Bank 1994). Yet, even if the bill await
 ing ratification is enacted, creation of the legal framework to allow working
 individuals to purchase such retirement plans is only a first step toward collecting
 these benefits since the existence of such a framework does not by itself guarantee
 that the anticipated outcomes will follow. For the system to actually take off and
 start operating in the direction foreseen by the bill, investors should be convinced
 that the demand for retirement plans to be offered would be large enough to make
 private pension business profitable. Even though the high population share of people
 of working age at this stage of demographic transition in Turkey provides reason
 for optimism,5 the emergence and actual growth of this demand will essentially
 depend on the working individuals' evaluation of (1) the affordability of contribu
 tions required to generate the desired flow of pension payments, and (2) the likeli
 hood of obtaining comparable real returns to other financial instruments with
 matching risk structures.
 If the contributions that the employers are currently required to make toward
 accumulation of severance payment funds for each employee are directed to money
 purchase schemes, every employee presently covered by a pension scheme will be
 able to purchase the retirement plans we consider without any additional cost. The
 introduction of a comprehensive unemployment insurance scheme through the
 pension reform act of 1999 already reduced the role of the severance payment
 program to provide a lump-sum retirement compensation. So, the funds needed
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 for money purchase schemes could be released by the dissolution of the severance
 payments program, which has long been the subject of controversy and abuse.
 Under the circumstances, affordability of the plans to be offered would not be an
 issue, even in the highly unlikely case of unwillingness by the employees to make
 additional contributions.
 The likelihood of obtaining comparable real returns to other financial instru
 ments with matching risk structures, on the other hand, requires further investiga
 tion. In fact, one of the important characteristics of money purchase pension plans
 is the lack of risk-sharing mechanisms, implying that members have to face all
 risks arising from the uncertainty about real income levels after retirement (Knox
 1993). Furthermore, the bill to be legislated in Turkey allows contributing indi
 viduals to have greater flexibility in choosing the asset composition of portfolios
 to be formed than in many other countries with similar schemes?see OECD (2000)
 for a comparison of regulations governing pension fund investments. So, in the
 absence of government subsidies to the scheme or other guarantees on minimum
 pension levels or minimum rates of return on the fund, unfavorable investment
 returns or low salary levels might lead to insufficient levels of income after retire
 ment. Then, what seems to be a good solution from the government's point of
 view may be disastrous for individuals who bear all the risks. This implies that
 evaluating the feasibility of a transition to these schemes, whether complete or
 complementary, requires a detailed analysis of the risks involved.
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze these risks and associated benefits under
 defined-contribution retirement plans (money purchase pension schemes) to be
 introduced in Turkey, and to assess the effectiveness of various risk-reduction strat
 egies that might be pursued by individuals as well as the government. For this
 purpose, we consider a money purchase pension scheme supplementary to the
 basic state scheme and investigate the potential level of benefits from alternative
 portfolios that might be selected under a contribution rate of 8 percent using an
 actuarial simulation model allowing for stochastic investment returns and salary
 increases. After justifying our choice of 8 percent as the contribution rate in refer
 ence to the dissolution of the severance payments program that we propose in the
 paper, we investigate and discuss the cost to the government of providing guaran
 tees on minimum pension incomes. We also consider effects of changes in indi
 viduals' investment strategies, retirement ages, and career patterns on the retirement
 benefits obtained.
 Pension Provisions and Money Purchase Plans
 Other than the assets owned by the individual, there are basically two sources of
 income available to cover working individuals against the loss of wage/salary in
 come after retirement. The first is often compulsory and universal coverage of so
 cial security typically designed to provide basic retirement income on a PAYG basis.
 PAYG schemes finance pension benefits of current retirees out of contributions that
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 currently active workers are required to make out of their salaries and are consid
 ered unfunded schemes. The second is complementary (compulsory or voluntary)
 pension plans that are designed to generate additional retirement income and are
 generally financed on a funded basis. Under these plans, contributions from mem
 bers and their employers are invested and accumulated in a fund and the stream of
 returns accruing to this fund is used to finance pensions paid to those members.
 There are two types of funded pension schemes distinguished by the distribu
 tion of risk and return between the members and the sponsor (generally the em
 ployer) (Davis 1995).6 Under a defmed-contribution (or money purchase) plan,
 the fund is usually based on regular contributions fixed as a proportion of salary,
 accumulated and invested in each member's account. Since the retirement income
 is generally provided by purchasing an annuity with the accumulated assets in the
 individual's account, the amount to be collected depends solely on the level of
 contributions and investment returns. The investment of the fund could be carried
 out by various financial institutions, such as insurance companies, unit trusts, and
 banks. The retirement income can normally be obtained from whole-life annuities
 offered by life insurance companies. A defmed-benefit plan, on the other hand,
 provides a retirement income calculated according to a predetermined formula,
 typically taking into account the duration of service and the individual's average
 salary over a certain period of time. The employer (or sponsor) guarantees the
 promised pension by pledging to supplement the fund whenever necessary. Unlike
 such defined-benefit plans in which the employer assumes the investment risk,
 there is no risk sharing under defined-contribution schemes that put the employer
 under any obligation other than a fixed contribution. Depending upon the market
 returns, the pension income actually received by the employee might be higher or
 lower than what they would have received under a defined-benefit plan. So, all
 investment risk stemming from the variability of investment return on accumu
 lated contributions is borne by the member/employee. Even though they do not
 allow for risk sharing, money purchase schemes offer maximum flexibility and
 facilitate mobility of the employee across jobs. When the employee switches to
 another job, the accumulated amount can be moved from one scheme to another,
 or left as is.
 Furthermore, since there is a direct relationship between investment returns
 and retirement benefits in money purchase schemes, there is no additional cost to
 the provider of deficit financing. This increases their popularity in pension reform
 proposals, which are usually introduced to avoid deficit-financing needs created
 by existing social security operations. In fact, the global experience of a slowdown
 in economic growth in the last decade made these deficits generated by PAYG
 based systems even more visible. With additional consideration given to the pros
 pects, in light of aging populations, that these deficits will further grow in the
 years ahead, the pressure to switch away from existing social security systems has
 increased. The favorable rates of return on assets relative to the growth rates of
 wages during the 1990s have also added to the popularity of funded schemes against
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 PAYG schemes, and many countries have moved toward funded schemes (Schwarz
 and Demirguc-Kunt 1999).7 Others, like Turkey, are in the process of setting up
 the legal and institutional framework to allow workers to have access to defined
 contribution pension plans. However, the transition from a PAYG to a funded scheme
 can be difficult, as the current generation is forced to pay twice to settle the exist
 ing debt of the old system. Besides this intergenerational fairness aspect and dif
 fering economic implications of each system, the transition requires external finance,
 generally from the government budget, and that is difficult to provide in a country
 already suffering from deficits created by the PAYG system.8
 Since money purchase schemes involve an investment risk for employees due
 to the uncertainty about the level of retirement income, there may be a demand for
 guarantees to cover employees against this uncertainty. These guarantees might be
 in the form of guaranteed minimum pensions or guaranteed rates of return on the
 fund. In any case, provision of such guarantees is costly and generally requires
 government backing (Daykin 1995). Despite their costs, these guarantees serve as
 safeguards to protect the employees against significant losses of income upon re
 tirement and need to be provided before any complete or partial transition to a
 funded system operating on a defined-contribution basis. This issue is particularly
 important in countries whose emerging markets are characterized by high average
 returns and volatility and low correlations with other markets as in Turkey (Akdeniz
 et al. 2000). In such countries, the level of investment risk might exceed accept
 able limits, depending upon the development level of financial markets and the
 human capital stock of the country. By comparison, an unfunded PAYG scheme,
 in which a pensioner's income mainly depends on the level of current contribu
 tions, is considered to be less risky in this respect and less costly to administer.
 Institutionally, money purchase pension schemes can be offered by two differ
 ent types of financial institutions. The first is a mutual fund, in which contributions
 are accumulated and invested on behalf of members, such as AFP (Administradoas
 de Fondos de Pensiones) in Chile. Maximizing the return on the fund, subject to an
 acceptable level of risk and expenses, is the main concern of such funds. Since the
 pension payable to the employee depends entirely upon the market value of the
 member's fund at retirement, a suitable investment policy may involve gradually
 decreasing the allocation to risky assets (such as equities) as retirement approaches.
 The second is life insurance companies that provide a monthly pension to the
 employee in return for their accumulated capital at retirement. These pensions are
 often in the form of annuities indexed to inflation. Therefore, assets that offer
 guaranteed real returns with minimum risk are required for those institutions to
 meet their liabilities.
 Modeling of the Proposed Money Purchase Plan
 In light of uncertainty concerning the level of retirement income, evaluating the
 feasibility of a transition to these schemes first requires a detailed analysis of the
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 risks involved from the member's point of view. The actuarial model introduced in
 this section is designed to investigate the possible variation in the retirement in
 come of a member of the proposed money purchase plan and to evaluate the cost
 of government subsidies toward guaranteed minimum pensions. Four different
 investment strategies were considered to be available to the workers purchasing
 the plan described below, and 1,000 simulations were run under each strategy by
 allowing for stochastic changes in relevant returns to contributions collected and
 in the salary levels of members. The robustness of results to changes in scheme
 assumptions were tested through sensitivity exercises. Simulation results reported
 in the next section point to the directions to reform the Turkish social security
 system.
 The money purchase pension scheme we consider is designed to supplement
 the basic old-age security scheme provided by the state, which is assumed to cover
 benefits on death, early retirement, sickness, and so on. The state is further as
 sumed to be capable of guaranteeing a minimum pension of 20 percent of final
 salary for workers who join the scheme by contributing a fixed proportion of their
 total annual salary. The amount of accumulated contributions up to retirement is
 used to purchase a whole-life indexed annuity (pension) at retirement. The contri
 butions and the investment income of the proposed plan are assumed to be tax
 free. Throughout this section we use real currency units adjusted for price inflation.
 Under these assumptions, the accumulation of contributions can be represented as
 where Aw is the total accumulated fund after W years of plan coverage before
 retirement, CR is the contribution rate as a percentage of yearly salary, E is admin
 istrative expenses as a fraction of the contributions paid in year t, SALt is the real
 annual salary paid at the of year t, and Rt is the real rate of investment return earned
 in year t.
 When the accumulated capital at the end of the contribution period, Aw, is in
 vested in a whole-life index-linked annuity, the present value of the yearly retire
 ment income that the member will collect by the end of his life is calculated using
 a constant discount rate of 3 percent per annum. Mathematically, the annual amount
 of indexed pension, P, at retirement is defined as
 w-\\ w
 Aw=CR'(l-E)-\SALw+^ \ [I (1 + *,) \SALt  (1)
 P = Aw/ax,  (2)
 where ?x is the actuarial present value of a whole-life annuity due of TL 1, payable
 at the beginning of each year, as long as the insured, who is currently at age x,
 survives, and is given by
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 where kpx is the probability of an individual aged x to survive for k years, and d is
 the discount rate (Bowers et al. 1986).
 In the simulations, ILO (1995) mortality assumptions for Turkey for the year
 2020 were used. In particular, with the retirement age, x, taken to be 55, the corre
 sponding actuarial present value term was found to be ?55 = 15.026 (for male, and
 at d = 3 percent).9
 The assumed contribution rate for the simulations is taken to be 8 percent of
 each salary. This choice of the contribution rate is not arbitrary. Instead, it is a rate
 that can easily be introduced without raising concerns about its affordability through
 a meager modification of current regulations. Roughly corresponding to one
 month's salary/wages for each year of service, the assumed rate is equivalent to
 the severance payment that employers are legally required to make to every em
 ployee who retires or gets fired for reasons that they cannot be blamed for. Intro
 duced for the first time in 1936, to act both as a deterrent, holding back employers
 from arbitrarily firing employees, and as an unemployment compensation or lump
 sum retirement benefit, the severance payment has long been subject to contro
 versy and abuse.10
 Furthermore, given that the pension reform act of 1999 introduced a compre
 hensive scheme for unemployment insurance, one of the major rationales behind
 severance payments became obsolete. Then, if severance payments are eliminated
 and the funds that the employers will save are channeled instead to contributions
 toward employees' membership in money purchase schemes, the role of sever
 ance payments as a lump-sum retirement benefit will also be replaced without
 additional costs on employers or employees. In fact, this will also give employees
 a chance to take advantage of higher returns on privately managed pension funds.
 Such a move is expected to create additional benefits since labor market distor
 tions caused by severance payments will now be avoided and the funds collected
 by pension funds will contribute to the deepening of financial markets. In other
 words, modifying the current regulations so as to require that employers pay 8
 percent of the salary for each employee as contributions for money purchase re
 tirement plans to complement the basic state scheme rather than toward severance
 payments will lead to a Pareto improvement. This is why the assumed contribution
 rate for simulations is taken to be 8 percent.11
 Other scheme design assumptions used in simulations are as follows:
 Entry age: 20;
 Retirement age: 55;
 Life type: single male;
 Career pattern: fully employed before retirement;
 Probability of preretirement mortality: zero;
 Postretirement mortality: ILO (1995) assumptions for Turkish mortality in
 the year 2020;
 Administrative expenses: 15 percent of the yearly contributions, zero after
 retirement.
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 In adjusting nominal values for consumer price inflation, the Cost of Living
 Index for Wage Earners series, regularly published by the Istanbul Chamber of
 Commerce (ICC), was used, enabling all model results to represent the purchasing
 power of an employee in today's money.
 Annual changes in the salary of an employee are assumed to be made through
 adjustments for inflation and promotional raises and to account for productivity
 gains. The use of real currency units in our simulations eliminates the need to
 consider adjustments due to price inflation separately. Promotional salary increases
 during the working life of an individual are assumed to be 1 percent per annum.
 The increases to account for productivity gains are captured through the growth in
 national productivity?assumed to be represented by the growth in gross national
 product (GNP) per employee, allowing a one-year time lag. This one-year lag is
 introduced to mimic the role of the previous year's productivity increases on the
 wage bargaining process between employees and employer. As for employment
 growth, the annual increases in national employment are assumed to be constant,
 for each year over the projection horizon, at 2 percent, which is the average annual
 growth rate of employment between 1989 and 1998. Based on these assumptions,
 real salary growth is projected through
 where St is the rate of change in real salary in year t, gt_: is the rate of real change
 in real GNP per employee in year t - 1, and p is the promotional salary increase
 (assumed to be constant at 1 percent for each year in the projection horizon).
 To randomize projected salaries, stochastic changes in real GNP are modeled
 by letting Zt represent an independently and identically distributed unit normal
 random variable and expressing gt as
 where a and \x represent the standard deviation and mean of this distribution, re
 spectively. Using historical data between 1924 and 1998, the estimators for the
 mean and standard deviation were obtained as ji = 0.045 and a = 0.075.
 For the accumulation of contributions up to retirement, two types of assets
 were used in the simulations: equities and government bonds. The real investment
 return on Turkish equities, rn was calculated using the composite equity index and
 average dividend yield of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) over the 1986-1998
 period. Estimators for the mean and standard deviation of the force of real equity
 returns, ln(l + rt), were found to be 0.079 for the mean and 0.772 for the standard
 deviation, reflecting the volatile nature of equity returns in Turkey (see, for ex
 ample, Akdeniz et al. 2000). As argued by Khorasanee (1995), the estimator for
 the standard deviation obtained from the historical data is too high for modeling
 equity returns as a log-normal, identically distributed, independent random vari
 able, as in the case of GNP growth. In search of an alternative, we considered the
 (4)
 (5)
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 Table 1
 Correlation of the Forces of Real Equity Returns
 k_1_2_3
 Correlation -0.6601 0.0843 -0.0685
 correlation coefficients of the force of real equity returns with its lagged values
 obtained from the same historical series. Table 1 reports the correlation of ln(l + r,)
 and ln(l+ rt_k) for k = {1,2,3}.
 The negative correlation for k = 1 and the alteration of signs for k = 2 and k = 3
 suggest that a stationary first-order autoregressive stochastic model for the force
 of real equity returns as described by Wilkie (1995) is suitable here. Following
 Wilkie (1995), therefore, the force of equity returns is modeled as
 ln(l + rf) = fx + p[ln(l + rf_1)-(i] + a(l-p2)1/2Z,, (6a)
 where rt is the equity return for year t, ji is the mean value of ln(l+r,), a is the
 standard deviation of ln(l+r?), p is the correlation coefficient of ln(l+r,) and
 ln(l+rM), and the Z, is normally distributed unit random variable.
 Equation (6a) states that the value of force of return for year t depends upon its
 previous value and a random error term, Zp as well as ji, a, and p. Using the values
 reported above, the equation becomes
 In(l + rt) = 0.079 - 0.660 [in (l + rt__x) - 0.079] + 0.580 N(0, l). (6b)
 As for the real returns on Turkish government bonds, i"f, the relevant rates were
 obtained from the one-year term domestic borrowing interest rates series. Estima
 tors for the mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients of the force of
 real bond returns, ln(l + if), with its lagged values were obtained using data for
 the 1984-1998 period. The mean and standard deviation were found to equal
 0.027 and 0.075, respectively; the coefficients of correlation between ln(l + it)
 and ln(l + it_^) fork - {1,2,3} are as reported in Table 2.
 The positive correlation for k - 1 and the rapid decline of the correlation for k -
 2 and 3 verify that a stationary, autoregressive stochastic model, as used to model
 equity returns, is suitable here as well (Wilkie 1995). Given the reported values of
 estimators of ji, o, and p, the force of real Turkish government bond returns can be
 expressed as
 In(l + it) = 0.027 + 0.465[in(l + it_x)- 0.027] + 0.067 N(0,l). (7)
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 Table 2
 Correlation of the Forces of Real Bond Returns
 k_1_2_3
 Correlation 0.465 0.161 -0.104
 Simulation Results
 In this section, we present the results from simulation experiments conducted using
 the stochastic model described above to generate 1,000 salary-return pairs and to
 calculate resulting pension incomes under each of the four different investment
 strategies we consider. The discussion is then carried out in reference to the statis
 tical properties (such as the mean, standard deviation, and the values corresponding
 to fifth to ninety-fifth percentiles) of this large sample of pension incomes obtained
 by converting accumulated contributions into annuities at the time of retirement.
 We start the discussion of simulation results on the level of retirement income
 (pension benefits) by comparing different investment strategies to assess the mag
 nitude of the risk facing members and the cost of government subsidies to provide
 guaranteed minimum pensions. The discussion then continues with the results of
 sensitivity exercises conducted to test the robustness of results to changes in the
 ages of entry into the system and retirement and the career pattern, as well as with
 respect to the gender of the member.
 Results Under Different Investment Strategies Considered
 The possible variation of retirement income as a percentage of final salary is simu
 lated for four different investment strategies, using the main scheme design as
 sumptions described in the third section. The following investment strategies were
 considered.
 Strategy A represents the option of investing the fund in Turkish equities through
 out the employee's period of service (thirty-five years).
 Strategy B represents the option of investing the fund in Turkish government
 bonds throughout the employee's thirty-five years of service.
 Strategy C represents the option of investing the fund in equities during the first
 fifteen years and then switching to government bonds for the remaining twenty
 years.
 Strategy D represents a balanced investment strategy with 50 percent of the
 fund invested in equities and the other 50 percent invested in government bonds
 for the whole period of service.
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 Table 3
 Pension Income as a Percentage of Final Salary Prior to Retirement
 Strategy C Strategy D
 Strategy A Strategy B 15 years equities 50% equities
 100% equities 100% bonds then bonds 50% bonds
 Mean 2.30 0.17 0.27 1.08
 Standard deviation 15.60 0.09 0.33 3.23
 Fifth percentile 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10
 First quartile 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.18
 Second quartile 0.49 0.14 0.19 0.32
 Third quartile 1.28 0.20 0.31 0.78
 Ninety-fifth
 percentile 7.65 0.34 0.69 3.67
 Possible levels of retirement income were obtained from simulations run under
 each investment strategy. Table 3 reports retirement incomes expressed as a pro
 portion of final salary (that is, in the form of replacement rates) by strategies and
 specific percentiles of the resulting distribution of 1,000 observations.
 The results in Table 3 indicate that Strategy A, which is presumed to be the
 riskiest strategy, provides the most generous retirement income relative to other
 strategies at all percentiles, except for the fifth percentile. The pension income is
 expected to equal 49 percent of the final salary with a probability of 50 percent
 (see Table 3, second quartile row). While yielding such high replacement rates?
 and hence, retirement incomes?Strategy A also generates considerable variation
 in the retirement income received by individuals, varying between 6 percent and
 765 percent (7.65 times) of the final salary at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles.
 The variability of the retirement income, which is one of the important risks of
 the money purchase scheme, can be reduced by investing in less volatile assets.
 Investing in government bonds?as in Strategy B, for example?is observed to
 clearly reduce the variability of income level. However, the median level of retire
 ment income is also reduced from 49 percent to 14 percent of the last earned
 salary. It is worth noting that the ninety-fifth percentile of the low risk Strategy B
 represents a lower income than the fiftieth percentile (second quartile) of the high
 risk Strategy A.
 The balanced investment Strategy D reduces the variability relative to Strategy
 A, mainly by decreasing the likelihood of receiving a higher income. Yet, this
 strategy also significantly reduces the possibility of receiving a lower income:
 Compare 6 percent to 10 percent?minimum replacement rates that might result
 under Strategies A and D?respectively. Although Strategy D represents a higher
 retirement income than Strategy A under the worst circumstances (at the fifth
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 Table 4
 Probability That Strategy /Provides Higher Income Than Strategy Z
 Z
 Prob( Y>Z) Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D
 Y
 Strategy A ? 0.82 0.74 0.57
 Strategy B 0.18 ? 0.37 0.20
 Strategy C 0.26 0.63 ? 0.31
 Strategy D 0.43 0.80 0.69 ?
 percentile), it generates a lower income as compared to Strategy A for all other
 percentiles.
 Investing in equities in the early years of the career, then switching to low-risk
 assets, as represented by Strategy C, also reduces the variability at the expense of
 a significantly reduced median retirement income.
 The probability that a particular investment strategy provides a higher retire
 ment income than an alternative strategy is given in Table 4 for each strategy.
 As observed in Table 4, investing purely in equities, as in Strategy A, provides a
 higher retirement income than the alternative Strategies B, C, and D, with prob
 abilities of 82 percent, 74 percent, and 57 percent, respectively. However, investing
 in low-risk assets, as in Strategy B, provides a higher income than Strategies A, C,
 and D, with probabilities of only 18 percent, 37 percent, and 20 percent, respec
 tively. All mixed investment strategies (C and D) have better probabilities than
 Strategy B, as investment in equities improves the performance of mixed strategies.
 Tactical Switching to Low-Risk Assets Before Retirement
 The retirement income risk of an individual increases as the size of the fund grows
 toward retirement. This is an important risk for the individual since unfavorable
 investment returns just before retirement may reduce the size of the fund mark
 edly and with no further chance of recovery. The commonly suggested approach
 to overcome this problem is switching to low-risk assets when retirement approaches
 (Davis 1995). The timing of such switching varies with the level of the accumu
 lated fund and the state of the financial market at the time of switching.
 To analyze the effect of such a tactical switching to low-risk assets here, the
 investment strategies we consider were modified by allowing the fund to be in
 vested in risk-free index-linked government bonds with a 3 percent real return a
 year just when the return on high-risk assets hit its peak within the five years
 preceding retirement.12 Another round of simulations was carried out to compare
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 the replacement ratios obtained after switching to index-linked bonds within five
 years of retirement, without changing any other characteristics of Strategies A
 through D. The results obtained after 1,000 runs under the tactical switching sce
 nario are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
 By comparing replacement ratios in Tables 3 and 5, one can assess the degree
 of risk protection obtained by switching. For Strategies A and D, the results show
 that switching to index-linked bonds during the last five years before retirement
 visibly reduces the risk of lower income and increases the possibility of receiving
 higher income. On the other hand, for Strategies B and C, the tactical switching
 does not considerably improve the risk of low income, nor does it affect chances
 of higher income to a significant extent. These results imply, in general, that switch
 ing to low-risk assets to reduce the negative effects of volatility of equity returns
 seems appropriate for Turkish financial markets. The results in Tables 4 and 6
 generally agree with this view as well.
 The Cost of Government Subsidies Toward Guaranteed
 Retirement Incomes
 Another alternative to reduce investment risk in money purchase pension schemes
 was noted to be a provision of a guaranteed level of income for each member of
 the scheme. For the proposed scheme, it was assumed that the government would
 guarantee a replacement ratio of 20 percent for each member of the scheme.
 The cost of this guarantee was calculated as a proportion of the employee's
 salary based on the assumption that the government would participate in the scheme
 as a contributor and pay a predetermined proportion of the employee's salary for
 each member of the scheme. In other words, the government is now required to
 add to the contributions paid by members at the rate of 8 percent of their salaries,
 in case the scheme itself fails to generate a minimum replacement rate of 20 per
 cent. The implementation of this policy requires that the government set up a fund
 to accumulate the amounts set aside to supplement contributions made by each
 member of the scheme and the applicable returns on them. The accumulated fund
 will then be used to top off the pension income of the member if this income turns
 out to be less than 20 percent of the last salary of the member prior to retirement.
 To simplify calculations, the real return on the amounts set aside as the government's
 contribution will be equal to the real growth of salaries for each year spent in the
 scheme. Then the cost of government subsidy, CJ, for a worker choosing strategy
 Y= {A,B,C,D}, can mathematically be expressed as
 CYG = I 0.20 - E [RRY \RRY < 0.20j * Prob [RRY < 0.20) * ?55 j / ns, (8)
 where RRY is the replacement that can be obtained under strategy Y, ?vob(RRY <
 0.20) is the probability that a replacement rate less than 20 percent might result
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 Table 5
 Pension Income as a Percentage of Final Salary Prior to Retirement:
 Modified Strategies Involving a Switch to Index-Linked Bonds Within the
 Last Five Years
 Strategy C Strategy D
 Strategy A Strategy B 15 years equities 50% equities
 100% equities 100% bonds then bonds 50% bonds
 Mean 2.91 0.17 0.25 1.50
 Standard deviation 13.51 0.08 0.23 5.84
 Fifth percentile 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.12
 First quartile 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.22
 Second quartile 0.65 0.15 0.18 0.43
 Third quartile 1.72 0.21 0.29 1.03
 Ninety-fifth
 percentile 9.59 0.35 0.67 4.67
 Table 6
 Probability That Modified Strategy /Provides Higher Income Than Strategy Z
 Z
 Prob( Y>Z) Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D
 Y
 Strategy A ? 0.87 0.81 0.58
 Strategy B 0.13 ? 0.39 0.15
 Strategy C 0.19 0.61 ? 0.23
 Strategy D 0.42 0.85 0.77 ?
 from investment strategy Y, E(RRY \RRY < 0.20) is the expected value of RRY when
 RRY < 0.20, and ns is the number of years in service.
 Table 7 presents the results obtained under the government subsidy scenario
 for each investment strategy. The probabilities that a smaller than 20 percent re
 placement rate might result from each investment strategy are shown in the first
 row of Table 7. It is observed that investing in equities, as in Strategy A, yields the
 lowest probability of receiving less than the guaranteed level of income?that is,
 24 percent. The expected pension of those below 20 percent will be equal to 11
 percent of final salary (row 2 in Table 7). The cost to the government of guarantee
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 Table 7
 The Cost of Government Guarantee as a Percentage Point Addition to the



























 Note: The numbers in the last row show the rate of government's contribution as a
 proportion of the employee's salary for each member of the scheme.
 minimum replacement rate of 20 percent will then be 1 percent of the salary of
 each member choosing Strategy A, and the government will have to pay the addi
 tional one point needed to increase the contribution rate to 9 percent. Whereas the
 balanced investment Strategy D requires the same level of cost of guarantee as
 Strategy A, the required subsidies under Strategies B and C will be equal to 3
 percent and 2 percent of the salary of each member, respectively. Given these
 results, the rate of government contribution multiplied by the service period and
 final salary will represent the total amount of subsidy for each member of the
 proposed scheme.
 Sensitivity Analysis
 Various sensitivity exercises were conducted to test the robustness of results to
 changes in the ages of entry into the system and retirement and the career pattern,
 as well as with respect to the gender of the member. Strategy D (50 percent eq
 uity-50 percent bond) was taken as the baseline case and for each sensitivity exer
 cise, 1,000 simulation runs were repeated by deviating from the main scheme
 design assumptions for Strategy D as follows:
 Sensitivity Exercise 1: change career pattern to alternating between full-time
 employment and part-time employment for every two years in a row;
 Sensitivity Exercise 2: change the assumed gender to female to have ?55 = 16.779
 (for female, and at d = 3 percent)?instead of ?55 = 15.026 (for male, and at d = 3
 percent), as reported in ILO (1995);
 Sensitivity Exercise 3: change scheme entry and retirement ages to 25 and 60,
 respectively (a60 - \2.923 male, ILO mortality assumption for 2020, at d = 3 percent).
 The simulated values of possible retirement incomes as a proportion of final
 salary are shown in Table 8. The results in Table 8 reveal that
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 Table 8
 Pension Income as a Percentage of Final Salary Prior to Retirement
 Baseline Sensitivity 1 Sensitivity 2 Sensitivity 3
 male, 55 male, 55 female, 55 male, entry: 25
 full-time part-time full-time retirement: 60
 Mean 1.08 0.47 1.03 1.17
 Standard deviation 3.23 1.29 2.65 2.84
 Fifth percentile 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.11
 First quartile 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.20
 Second quartile 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.38
 Third quartile 0.78 0.37 0.73 0.89
 Ninety-fifth
 percentile 3.67 1.63 4.39 4.60
 the retirement income for females provided by the scheme is lower than that
 provided for males at the same retirement age;
 part-time or seasonal employees receive a lower income than the full-time
 employees at all percentiles, proportionately with their shorter contribution
 period; and
 later retirement provides a higher income even when the contribution period
 stays the same.
 It must be noted that although the results are somewhat sensitive to changes in
 basic scheme design assumptions underlying the baseline simulations with Strategy
 D, the differences are not sufficiently large enough to raise serious concerns about the
 usefulness of previous discussion, nor the conclusions presented in the next section.
 Conclusions
 The currently planned introduction of privately managed defined-contribution (or
 money purchase) retirement plans within the framework of the recent social secu
 rity reform process in Turkey has widely been argued to have a significant poten
 tial to affect the direction of further development of financial markets in the coming
 years. Although the likely benefits of the emergence of a market for money pur
 chase pension schemes for the development and deepening of financial markets
 are generally agreed upon, there has been a severe lack of discussion on the ques
 tion of whether there really is a potential for such a market to develop in Turkey.
 This paper aimed to help fill this gap by laying the ground for an evaluation of the
 prospects for the emergence and growth of demand for money purchase retire
 ment plans. For this purpose, the paper presented results from an actuarial simula
 tion model developed to analyze employees' investment risks and associated
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 under these retirement plans and assessed the potential of various risk-reduction
 strategies that might be pursued by individuals as well as the government.
 More specifically, we considered a money purchase pension scheme, supple
 mentary to the basic state scheme, and investigated the potential level of pension
 benefits from alternative portfolios that might be selected under a given contribu
 tion rate of 8 percent, by allowing for stochastic investment returns and salary
 increases. We proposed that the contributions for money purchase schemes could
 be financed by the dissolution of the severance payments program, whose role had
 already been reduced to provision of a lump-sum retirement compensation by the
 unemployment insurance scheme introduced through the pension reform act of
 1999. Indeed, if the contributions that the employers are currently required to make
 toward accumulation of severance payment funds at the rate of 8 percent of the
 salary of each employee are directed to money purchase schemes, all employees
 will be able to purchase the retirement plans we consider without incurring addi
 tional costs.
 Possible variations in the pension income of a member were then captured by
 simulation results from a model we designed for this purpose and implemented
 using investment and salary earnings data from Turkey. The growth in salary earn
 ings was assumed to be related to the GNP growth rate per employee, which is
 modeled as an independently and identically distributed log-normal random vari
 able. The forces of return on Turkish equities and government bonds, on the other
 hand, were modeled as stationary first-order autoregressive stochastic processes as
 described by Wilkie (1995). The model was also used to investigate the cost to the
 government of providing guarantees on minimum pension incomes, and sensitivity
 exercises were carried out to see effects of changes in individuals' investment strat
 egies, retirement ages, and career patterns on the retirement benefits obtained.
 Our results indicated that equities might have significant advantages over gov
 ernment bonds, as investing in equities alone (Strategy A) provides the highest
 median income with a reasonable downside risk compared to other strategies. In
 return for an 8 percent contribution rate invested in equities for thirty-five years,
 the proposed scheme might produce a pension income of about 50 percent of the
 final preretirement salary of the employee, with a probability of 50 percent. The
 downside risk, which is likely to occur with a 5 percent probability, is reasonable
 relative to other strategies, particularly B and C: The "worst case" level of pension
 income to be obtained corresponds to 6 percent of the final salary, and this is
 somewhat, but not radically, lower than 7 percent and 8 percent of the final salary
 to be received under the worst cases of Strategies B and C, respectively. If the
 individual chooses to switch to low-risk assets during the last five years before
 retirement, on the other hand, Strategy A remains the strategy that is likely to
 produce the highest median income, whereas the improvement in downside risk
 associated with this strategy enables the individual to receive a higher pension
 income than they would have under Strategies B and C (10 percent versus 8 per
 cent of the final salary). Furthermore, Strategy A (along with Strategy D) proves to
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 be the strategy with the lowest cost to the government in case it chooses to step in
 to provide guaranteed minimum replacement rates of 20 percent to all members:
 Minimum pension guarantees under Strategies A and D require government par
 ticipation to member contributions at the rate of only one percentage point, whereas
 member contributions under Strategies B and C, respectively, require three points
 and two points of supplements by the government for the same minimum level of
 guaranteed pension incomes. To summarize, the employees who are willing to
 maintain a significant share of equities in their portfolios may collect windfall
 profits after the introduction of money purchase schemes, provided that the trends
 of returns to financial assets and GNP growth over the past decade continue. Given
 the large variation in asset returns, however, it might be wise for employees to
 demand government guarantees.
 Broadly speaking, these results point to a significant role to be played by equity
 markets in Turkey in attracting workers to money purchase schemes. So, it appears
 likely that a sizable number of employees will be willing to contribute either to top
 the 8 percent in employer contributions, which might be redirected away from sev
 erance payments, or just to participate on their own. So, the legislation of the current
 bill is likely to act as a first step in promoting the emergence and growth of a sizable
 market for defmed-contribution retirement plans to be offered by the private sector.
 Such a development, if it actually happens, will have significant consequences
 for Turkey. First, it will give the government a chance to readjust the contribution
 and replacement rates for the current state scheme in such a way as to reduce
 pension deficits beyond what would result from the reform of 1999 without under
 mining the living standards of workers and retirees. It appears feasible, for ex
 ample, to reduce replacement rates for the basic scheme and introduce lower cost
 subsidies toward minimum pension guarantees from money purchase schemes,
 and yet, not to make the retirees worse off. In fact, it seems possible to achieve
 considerable savings in pension deficits of publicly managed schemes whereas
 allowing (even assuring) the combined pensions from state and private schemes to
 exceed current levels, thereby making retirees better off. Furthermore, the em
 ployee and employer shares, as well as the levels of contribution rates for the basic
 scheme, can be adjusted both to increase current disposable incomes of active
 workers and to provide employers an incentive for prompt payment of contribu
 tions13 without letting pension deficits soar. Second, although it is difficult to pro
 vide an estimate as to its magnitude, the volume of transactions in the financial
 markets is certain to increase significantly, especially if the severance payment
 program is dissolved and current contributions are channeled into money pur
 chase schemes instead.
 The implications of the new system are likely to go beyond the volume of
 transactions in the financial markets or macroeconomic balances of the country.
 Perhaps most important, the pension system to be set up will enable the employees
 to share in capital income. In the foreseeable future, returns to capital are likely to
 grow faster than returns to labor in most parts of the world, just as they did in the
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 recent past, and this is even more likely to happen in a fast-growing country like
 Turkey. Giving employees a chance to get their share of this growth in capital
 income will definitely help improve income distribution in Turkey, thereby con
 tributing to increased welfare and stability in the country.
 Given these far-reaching consequences, the issues addressed in this paper de
 serve further investigation and extensive discussion. Although a comprehensive
 list of future lines of research that are needed the most is beyond the scope of this
 paper, our suggestions (and plans) for future research include the following. First,
 the analysis in this paper leaves the question on the magnitude of additional funds
 flowing into financial markets unanswered. As a result, we were forced to assume
 implicitly that the past trends of the real returns on equities and bonds would be
 maintained even after the establishment of the funded pension system. This as
 sumption (that was employed for the lack of a better alternative at the moment) is
 perhaps the major weakness of the present analysis, as the emergence of money
 purchase schemes is likely to alter prices of assets and their returns sometime after
 the initial takeoff. Depending upon their magnitude relative to current levels of
 investment, the inflow of additional funds may even cause instability in asset prices
 or stock price inflation. Any study attempting to predict likely changes in returns
 by, for example, appealing to the experience of other countries with a history of
 money purchase pension schemes would be a very welcome addition to the litera
 ture. Once results from such studies become available, investigations similar to the
 one in this paper would be enabled to produce more reliable results. Second, test
 ing the robustness of results presented here by repeating the simulations with alter
 native stochastic returns series generated using different techniques?preferably
 those with well-documented performance records with Turkish data (see, for ex
 ample, Metin and Muradoglu 2000) would be a good idea. Likewise, repeating
 them by incorporating information about the returns on foreign assets, which will
 presumably be available for inclusion in the retirement plan portfolios, might im
 prove the relevance of results. Last, but not least, relevance of the analysis for
 policy discussion may be increased by estimating the total cost of subsidies that the
 government will need to provide under the guaranteed minimum pension income
 scenario by taking into account the estimated number and distribution across port
 folio types of employees who would be willing to become members of retirement
 plans to be offered. The financing of these government subsidies is another issue
 that must be considered by policymakers, preferably by taking into account possi
 bilities of adjustments in the pension program parameters of the current PAYG
 system, which will be easier to make in the presence of money purchase schemes
 that provide another pillar.
 Notes
 1. Excluding such limited-distribution papers as Teksoz et al. (1998) and Sayan and
 Teksoz (2001).
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 2. See Sayan and Kenc (1999) for an overlapping generations, general equilibrium
 investigation of the long-run effects of parametric pension reform in Turkey.
 3. The results in Sayan and Turhan-Sayan (2000) provide evidence that the parametric
 reform of 1999 is not likely to eliminate the pension deficit, which makes up the largest part
 of social security imbalances.
 4. The letter describes the policies that the Turkish government plans to implement to
 secure the Fund's support in the context of the ongoing stabilization (disinflation) and
 structural adjustment program.
 5. See Kenc and Sayan (2001) for past and projected changes in the age composition of
 the Turkish population and a comparative analysis of demographic transition in Turkey and
 the European Union.
 6. We do not consider individualized pension plans managed by life insurance compa
 nies without the involvement of the employer here as the number of people covered by such
 plans is negligible.
 7. The list of countries that have switched from PAYG to funded schemes includes
 Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Colombia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Swe
 den, and Uruguay.
 8. When contributions to the PAYG system are collected through payroll taxes, they
 distort labor supply decisions and resource allocation, and might affect the competitiveness
 of the country in international markets. PAYG schemes may also discourage capital forma
 tion by reducing the incentives to save, whereas funded systems tend to increase savings
 and the demand for long-term assets like equities and bonds, thereby stimulating economic
 growth. See Kenc and Perraudin (1997) for a dynamic programming simulation of
 distortionary effects of various pension rules and regulations on labor supply and Huang et
 al. (1997) for an overlapping generations, general equilibrium analysis of the issues in
 volved in a transition from PAYG to funded schemes. Sayan and Kiraci (2001b) and Sayan
 (2001) point out that transitional aspects are important, even in the context of parametric
 reform introduced to rehabilitate a PAYG system and discuss some of the implications of
 introducing pension reform by gradually changing system parameters over a transitional
 period, as opposed to changing them once and for all.
 9. ?55 = 15.026 implies that an individual who would like to collect TL 1 a year as
 pension income after the age of 55 until death must have accumulated TL 15.026 in contri
 butions net of administrative costs during his working life.
 10. It was claimed, for example, that severance payments put an additional burden on
 employers who are forced to downsize because of financial difficulties and insufficient
 demand during times of recession. On the other hand, many employers have chosen to fire
 employees right before they become eligible for severance payment and, hence, continu
 ously avoided making severance payments by replacing them with newly hired workers.
 11. The policy switch proposed here does not rule out the possibility of adding two to
 three points to the contribution rate for those employees who are willing to make the extra
 payment, and the simulation framework we develop is flexible enough to easily accommo
 date such an increase in the contribution rate.
 12. In fact, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to know with certainty
 that a particular rate of return observed at a point in time within a five-year period is the
 highest that can occur until their retirement. So, the assumption about the timing of the
 switch to indexed bonds (implying perfect foresight on the part of the employee/member of
 the scheme) may seem unrealistic. Yet, this is perhaps the only workable assumption here.
 13. It is shown in Sayan (1999) that it will be possible to come up with many alternative
 configurations of contribution rates, lowering the burden on the employee, the employer, or
 both, should the compliance issue be resolved and evasion of contribution payments be
 stopped or reduced.
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